As reluctant as I am to take issue with the well considered opinion of Mark Levin, I find myself doubting that the constitutional case against the Slaughter Rule is as open and shut as I have heard him and other conservative commentators describe. While the procedure set forth in the Slaughter Rule of considering the Senate Bill to have been “deemed passed” is clearly contrary to the legal history and tradition of the country, and to the concept of democracy more generally, there is no particular command in Article 1, Section 7 of the Constitution, or any other place within its text, that definitively rebuts the Slaughter Rule.
Article 1, section 7 of the Constitution states:
Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a law. But in all such cases the votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each House respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law.
Mark Levin and other commentators point out from that text two phrases of paramount importance. The first is the first sentence which states that “Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States,” and the second comes in the middle of the paragraph to say that “in all such cases the votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and nays.” From these two phrases, and with reference to Clinton v. City of New York, commentators have deemed it obvious that the Constitution requires actually voting on the bill to pass it. Obvious and correct as this ought to be, it’s not actually what the Constitution says.
To begin again at the start of the paragraph, the clause introduces itself with the words “Every bill which shall have passed” (emphasis added). Those words, right there, are in the past tense. This paragraph, right from the start, is not talking about how to pass a bill; it is, rather, talking about how to take a passed bill and turn it into a law. The remainder of the paragraph is consistent with the understanding that it applies to passed bills, rather than bills to be passed. It first describes the presentment to the President, explains the process for handling a veto, including its override, and further explains what happens to bills that the President leaves sitting on his desk. All of the things described by the paragraph are only possible on bills which both houses have finished with. This paragraph, in other words, assumes that a bill has been passed somehow, but offers no command for how that passage must come about.
Reading on to the second interesting clause, the bill says that “the votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and nays” in “all such cases.” The inclusion of the word “such” is clearly an invitation to examine the preceding context of that phrase and to limit its scope accordingly. The preceding context is none other than the process for overriding a Presidential veto, meaning that what that sentence tells us is that vetos may be overridden only by yeas and nays, and that it is limited to that meaning by its own terms. Had the word “such” been omitted, Levin would have a stronger position, although he would still have an uphill battle to defeat the obvious context in which that phrase was placed.
Ultimately, the strongest argument against the Slaughter Rule are originalist rather than textualist, and Clinton v. New York guides the way. In that case, the Supreme Court held that laws can only be formed when (among other things) “a bill containing its exact text was approved by a majority of the Members of the House of Representatives.” But even this language leaves open the argument that, because it takes a majority to adopt a rule, and the rule contains an approval of the bill, passing the rule is tantamount to a majority of Representatives approving the bill. Regardless, it is clear that the Supreme Court has recognized that there is a traditional process for passing laws, which is a good sign.
I have little doubt that the founders would be astonished to learn that the Slaughter Rule is even being considered. The English law traditions they inherited and the process the country has followed consistently ever since the founding is clear in that bills are passed with majority votes, not with parliamentary trickery.
If the Senate Bill should pass on the basis of the Slaughter Rule, I wish Mark Levin the best of luck in bringing his lawsuit and having the bill stricken in court. There is no doubt that the proposed rule is an abuse of process and a direct assault on American tradition, perpetrated by politicians waging a war against the liberty of the American people. I do believe, though, that it would be a mistake to rely on the text of the Constitution alone to defeat the Slaughter Rule.
Tags: constitution, healthcare